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AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA)--OLDER
WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT (OWBPA)--RATICATION-
TENDER BACK-The Supreme Court of the United States held that an
employee's ADEA claim is not barred when a waiver thereof does not
comply with the specific requirements of OWBPA, even if the employee
does not return or offer to return the consideration received for releasing
claims against an employer.
Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998).
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ("ADEA") to '"promote the employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment; and to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment."' Since its enactment, the ADEA has been amended
numerous times.2 In 1990, Congress passed the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA"), which sets forth the minimum
requirements necessary for a valid, knowing, and voluntary waiver
of an ADEA claim.'
The petitioner, Dolores M. Oubre ("Oubre"), was employed by
the respondent, Entergy Operations, Inc., ("EOI") as an assistant
scheduler in the Planning and Scheduling Department at a power
plant in Killona, Louisiana. In 1994, EOI implemented a new em-
ployee ranking procedure called the "Management Planning and
Review Ranking Process."5 Oubre received the lowest possible
ranking and was notified by her supervisor that she had the option
1. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1998).
2. The ADEA was enacted in 1967 and amended in 1974, 1978, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1990,
and 1996. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1998).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)-(H) (1998).
4. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 838, 840 (1998); see also Petitioner's
Brief at 5, Oubre (No. 96-1291). Specifically, Oubre worked at the Waterford Steam
Electric Generating Station and had been employed there for seven years. Petitioner's
Brief at 5.
5. Respondent's Brief at 2, Oubre (No. 96-1291). Under the ranking process, all
salaried employees at the plant were ranked in comparison to their peers in the catego-
ries of performance and potential. Id. Each employee was then placed in a group rang-
ing from 1 to 9 (1 being the highest and 9 the lowest). Id.
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of improving her performance or resigning voluntarily and receiv-
ing severance compensation.6 After reviewing the information
from EOI for fourteen days and consulting with two attorneys,
Oubre decided to accept the severance pay and sign the release.'
The release Oubre signed waived all of her present and future
rights against EOI.8 However, the release did not comply with the
specific statutory requirements set forth in OWBPA-
After receiving all of her severance pay from EOI, Oubre filed a
charge of age discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC").'9 The EEOC declined to pursue
Oubre's charge but issued her a "right-to-sue" letter.' Oubre then
commenced suit against EOI in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging constructive discharge
on the basis of age.'2 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of EOI, holding that, although the waiver did not comply
with the requirements of OWBPA, Oubre's failure to tender back
the severance pay constituted a ratification of the waiver.'" The
6. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 840. As an employee with a 9 ranking, if Oubre was ranked a 9
again in the next evaluation, she would be terminated without the benefit of any sever-
ance pay. Petitioner's Brief at 7 and Respondent's Brief at 3, Oubre (No. 96-1291). Oubre
had the option of either remaining with the company and working to improve her 9 rank-
ing or signing a release and receiving severance pay.
7. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 840. Oubre received severance pay totaling $6,258. Id.
8. Id.
9. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., No.CIV.A. 95-3168, 1996 WL 902063, at *1 (E.D.
La. 1996). In relevant part, the release stated that "I, Dolores M. Oubre, knowingly, vol-
untarily, and for valuable consideration agree to waive, settle, release, and discharge any
and all claims, demands, damages, actions, or causes of action . . . that I may have
against Entergy .... " Id. The United States Supreme Court held that "the release did not
comply with at least three of the specific requirements listed in OWBPA." Oubre, 118 S.
Ct. at 840. Specifically, the Court noted that EOI did not give Oubre enough time to
consider her options, nor did it give her seven days after she signed the release to
change her mind. Id. Furthermore, according to the Court, the release made no specific
reference to claims under the ADEA. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(B),(F),(G) (1998).
10. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 840.
11. Id. A would-be plaintiff must first file a charge with the EEOC and walt 60 days
before filing a civil action in court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1998).
12. Id.
13. Oubre, 1996 WL 902063, at *1. OWBPA provides requirements that must be met in
order to validly waive an ADEA claim. Id. According to the Oubre Court, there is no
dispute that the requirements were not met in this case. Id. at *2. Nevertheless, the
court followed the Fifth Circuit's holding in Wamsley v. Champlin Refining & Chemi-
cals, Inc., 11 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 1993), in which a waiver that failed to meet the require-
ments of OWBPA was held to be voidable at the employee's option, not void. Id. In
Wamsley, the court held that "the employee manifests an intention to be bound by the
waiver and makes a [new, enforceable] promise to abide by its terms if the employee
does not tender back the benefits paid in consideration for the agreement." Wamsley, 11
F.3d at 540. The Oubre Court held that "since the facts fit Wamsley, we are not at liberty
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.4 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, reversed,
and remanded the case for further proceedings.'5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether the common law doctrines of tender back and ratification
apply to ADEA claims."6 EOI claimed that by retaining the sever-
ance pay, Oubre ratified the defective waiver and, therefore, her
ADEA action was barred. 7 However, the United States Supreme
Court rejected this argument and held that the waiver could not
bar the ADEA claim because it did not conform to OWBPA re-
quirements.8 Noting that the common law and contract principals
of tender back and ratification invoked by EOI did not apply, the
Court held that a waiver cannot be a valid release of an employee's
ADEA claim unless it complies with OWBPAN9 In Oubre's case, it
was undisputed that the waiver did not comply with OWBPAM0
Therefore, the Court concluded that Oubre's waiver of the ADEA
claim could not be enforced against her and, therefore, her ADEA
suit was not barred.2
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agreed that, because the
waiver did not comply with the strict requirements of OWBPA,
Oubre was free to bring her ADEAsuit without tendering back the
to disregard the law announced by the Fifth Circuit." Oubre, 1996 WL 902063, at *2.
14. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 112 F.3d 787, 788 (1996). The court of appeals
found no reversible error in either the record or the parties' briefs and, without further
explanation, affirmed the district court's holding. Id.
15. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 841-42. The court held that, although Oubre had not returned
or offered to return the money she received for signing the release, because the defec-
tive release did not comply with OWBPA, it could not bar Oubre's ADEA claims. Id. at
842.
16. Id. at 841. The tender back doctrine requires that a plaintiff return the considera-
tion received in exchange for a release on the theory that it is inconsistent to bring suit
against the defendant while at the same time retaining the consideration received in
exchange for a promise not to bring such a suit. Id. at 845.
In contract law, ratification is the "act of adopting or confirming a previous act
which without ratification would not be an enforceable contractual obligation ... "
BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 1262 (6th ed. 1990). Furthermore, "[t]he act of ratification
causes the obligation to be binding as if such was valid and enforceable in the first in-
stance." Id.
17. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 840-41. When she decided to sue, Oubre did not give back,
nor did she offer to give back, the severance pay received in return for waiving all future
rights against EOI. Id.
18. Id. at 842. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 840.
19. Id. at 842; 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(1) (1998).
20. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 842.
21. Id. Oubre's ADEA claims were not barred even though she did not tender back
the severance pay received. Id.
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severance pay from EOI.= However, Justice Breyer specified that
the invalid waiver was not entirely void of legal effect but, instead,
was voidable only at Oubre's option.' He also noted that, although
noncompliance with the requirements of OWBPA prohibited ratifi-
cation of the previous agreement, that agreement, itself, was void-
able, not void.' Justice Breyer further stated that, because the
agreement was voidable and Oubre's suit was not barred, once
Oubre abandoned her original promise and filed suit, EOI was enti-
tled to ask for restitution of the severance pay.25
Justice Thomas dissented from the majority opinion and found
that OWBPA does not address the doctrines of tender back or rati-
fication; therefore, OWBPA does not supersede these common law
doctrines." He determined that, because OWBPA merely defines
"knowing and voluntary" and does not address tender back or rati-
fication, both common law doctrines should apply to ADEA claims
as well as other claims.27 As a result, Justice Thomas rejected the
majority's reasoning and argued that Oubre's claim should be
barred.'
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia concurred with
Justice Thomas' argument that OWBPA does not supersede the
common law doctrines of tender back and ratification.' Justice
22. Id. at 843 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer noted that "a promise ratifying a
voidable contract may itself be voidable for the same reason as the original promise, or
it may be voidable or unenforceable for some other reason." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS 2D § 85, Comment b, (1979)). The concurring opinion was joined by Justice
O'Connor. Id.
23. Id. at 84344. Justice Breyer found that the contract created was voidable and
Oubre could have either avoided or ratified it. Id. In support of his argument, Justice
Breyer reasoned that "it seems unlikely that Congress, enacting a statute meant to pro-
tect workers, would have wanted to create ... a void waiver as a result of an employer's
failure to follow the law, ... whether or not... [the employee] intended to bring suit."
Id. at 844.
24. Id. at 844.
25. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 844(Breyer, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas relied on the long-established
principle that "a statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the common
law in order to abrogate it." Id. He also noted that "[s]tatutes which invade the common
law... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident." Id.
Justice Thomas further stated that "the OWBPA does not address the tender back or
ratification doctrines at all, and thus, the doctrines apply and Oubre's suit is barred." Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in this dissenting opinion. Id.
27. Id. at 846.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia agreed without further explana-
tion. Id.
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Scalia further agreed that, because Oubre did not tender back the
severance pay, the judgment of the court of appeals barring Ou-
bre's ADEA claim should be affirmed. ° However, Justice Scalia did
not agree that ratification provided a separate basis for affirming
the Court of Appeals' decision.3' He reasoned that "since the
OWBPA both requires that a waiver of an ADEA claim must be
'knowing and voluntary' and [also] provides requirements for such
a waiver, a waiver which does not comply with the statute cannot
be ratified."32 Because Oubre's waiver did not comply with OW-
BPA's requirements, Justice Scalia's position was that the Court of
Appeals' decision should be affirmed based on the lack of tender
back but not on the ratification doctrine.'
On December 15, 1967, President Johnson signed into law the
now-controversial ADEA_' The primary purpose of the ADEA as
enacted in 1967 was "to eliminate age discrimination against older
applicants in hiring."' The ADEA was first amended in 1974 as part
of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974; however, the
1978 amendments provided the first major changes to the ADEA
statute.' The 1978 amendments revised Sections 623, 630, 631,
633a, and 634 of Title 29 and Sections 8335 and 8339 of Title 5.3"
The amendments included changes to the involuntary retirement
and jury trial provisions of the ADEA and transferred the authority
to enforce the ADEA from the Secretary of Labor to the EEOC.'
30. Oubre, 118 S. Ct at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. Id. Justice Scalia noted that the plain language of the statute, on its face, did not




34. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1998). The ADEA combines Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id.
35. DANIEL P. O'MEARA, PROTECTING THE GROWING NUMBER OF OLDER
WORKERS: THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 1-19, 49-52 (University
of Pennsylvania, The Warton School, 1989) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4. (1967). As originally enacted, the ADEA prohibited discrimination in the private
sector on the basis of age of individuals between forty and sixty-five years of age. Id. at
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 634 (1998).
36. Id. at 15 (citing Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28-29, 88 Stat. 55, 74-76 (1974)). O'Meara
notes that, in 1974, Congress expanded the ADEA to include more businesses by chang-
ing the minimum number of employees necessary for the ADEA to apply from twenty-
five to twenty. Id. Federal, state, and local government employees were also covered
under the ADEA for the first time. Id. Moreover, four years later, the 1978 Amendments
codified the result in LoriUard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (guaranteeing all parties the
right to a jury trial) and overruled United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). Id.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1998).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. See Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189-193 (1978). Congress
1998
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The 1984, 1986, and 1987 amendments expanded the ADEA's pro-
tection in the areas of health care, mandatory retirement, and em-
ployee pension benefit plansY
Pursuant to the 1990 amendments, Congress enacted OWBPA.'
OWBPA sets forth the requirements that render valid the waiver of
an ADEA claim.4' The statute provides that "[a]n individual may not
waive any [ADEA] right or claim unless the waiver is knowing and
voluntary" and sets forth minimum requirements that must be met
for a waiver to be considered knowing and voluntary. 2
granted the EEOC investigative, record keeping, and enforcement responsibility. Id.
39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. See also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369
(1985) (extending the ADEA's health insurance requirements to workers between the
ages of sixty-five and sixty-nine); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) (extending protections available under the ADEA to
workers in the private sector and most state and local government workers seventy
years of age and older and exempting from mandatory retirement for seven years state
and local public safety officers); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1988) (requiring employers to continue paying pension benefits
according to plan requirements without regard to age as a factor in such benefits).
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 626. The 1990 Amendments amended Title 29, sections 623, 630,
and 631. See OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101433,104 Stat. 978 (1990), noting as follows:
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, amends the . . . ADEA in two
important respects. The bill makes clear that discrimination on the basis
of age in virtually all forms of employee benefits is unlawful. In addition,
the bill ensures that older workers are not coerced or manipulated into
waiving their rights to seek legal relief under the ADEA.
Id. at 5.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (1998).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)-(H), (f)(2) (1998). The minimum requirements that must
be present for a valid waiver of an ADEA claim are as follows:
(A) the waiver is a part of an agreement between the individual and the
employer that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by
such individual, or by the average individual eligible to participate;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under
this Act; (C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may
arise after the date the waiver is executed; (D) the individual waives
rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to
anything of value to which the individual already is entitled; (E) the
individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior
to executing the agreement; (F)(i) the individual is given a period
of at least 21 days within which to consider the agreement; or
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or
other employment termination program offered to a group or class
of employees, the individual is given a period of at least 45 days within
which to consider the agreement; (G) the agreement provides that for a
period of at least 7 days following the execution of such agreement,
the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not
become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired;
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or
other employment termination program offered to a group or class
of employees, the employer (at the commencement of the period specified
in subparagraph (F) informs the individual in writing a manner
calculated to be understood by the average eligible to participate, as
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Oubre is the first case in which the United States Supreme
Court renders an opinion based on OWBPA. Nevertheless, a simi-
lar issue was presented in the 1968 decision of Hogue v. Southern
Railway Co., in which the Supreme Court considered whether the
tender back of consideration was a prerequisite to a railroad em-
ployee's bringing of an action under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act ("FELA").' After Hogue suffered a knee injury at work, he
executed a release of all claims against the railroad in return for
consideration.' The Court rejected the railroad company's argu-
ment that tender back of the consideration is required unless the
execution of a release is obtained by fraud.' The Court held that to
require the consideration to be tendered back before allowing a
suit to be filed would be contrary to the policy of the Act.' How-
ever, the Court also held that, in the absence of tender back, the
amount of the consideration should be deducted from any award
ultimately due to the employee.47
Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, the first case of significance after the
1990 enactment of OWBPA, applied and extended the Hogue
Court's view on tender back.' In Oberg, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a severance agreement
that does not comply with OWBPA is not a knowing and voluntary
waiver and, therefore, cannot be considered to be ratified by an
to - (i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program,
any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits applicable
to such program; and (ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible
or selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same
job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected
for the program.
Id. Furthermore, the individual must be given a reasonable period of time within which to
consider the settlement agreement. Id.
43. Hogue v. Southern Ry. Co., 390 U.S. 516 (1968).
44. Id. at 517. Hogue received $105, which he did not return or offer to return before
filing suit. Id.
45. Id. The Supreme Court reiterated that "[w]e have held that an express agreement
of an injured employee who obtained funds from a carrier to help defray living expenses
first to return the sum paid as a prerequisite to the filing and maintenance of an action
under the FELA was void under § 5 of the Act." Id.
46. Id. at 518.
47. Id.
48. Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 11 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1993). As part of a reduction
in force, Allied fired 60 employees, including the plaintiffs in this case. Id. As part of
their severance agreements, the plaintiffs promised to release Allied from all claims
arising from their employment. Id. at 681. The severance agreements also provided that
in the event of a plaintiffs breach, that plaintiff was required to return all severance
benefits to Allied. Id.
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employee who retains the consideration.4' Judge Flaum, writing for
the court, specified that the tender back of consideration is not a
prerequisite to commencement of an ADEA claim.' Therefore, the
court concluded that the severance agreement drafted by Allied
Van Lines did not comply with OWBPA requirements and held that
the company could not enforce its severance agreement against
the plaintiffs as a valid waiver of their ADEA claims."
In Wamsley v. Champlin Refining and Chemicals, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the issues
addressed in Oberg and reached a contrary conclusion.' Champlin
employees Wamsley, Whittenberg, Nagy, and Sanders were among
those informed that they were going to be "let go" as the result of
an office being closed.' Each employee was provided with a "No-
tice Pertaining to Release of Claims" document and a "Release of
Claims" agreement.' The releases waived any action or claim an
employee might have against Champlin and in return for signing
the waiver, each employee received severance benefits that he or
she otherwise would not have been entitled to receive.' Although
the notice specifically allowed the employees to take up to forty-
five days to consider executing the waiver, the employees brought
suit, alleging that Champlin failed to provide them with the forty-
five days in which to consider the agreement as required by
OWBPA.' Because the employees did not return or offer to return
the severance benefits they received before filing suit, Champlin
argued that even if the waivers were invalid, the employees ratified
the waivers by retaining the benefits." Judge DeMoss, writing for
49. Id. at 683. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs did not return or offer to return the
severance pay before filing suit. Id. at 681. Allied admitted that, at the time the waivers
were signed, OWBPA was in effect; however, the waivers did not comply with the provi-
sions. Id. Nevertheless, Allied argued that, even if the waivers were invalid under
OWBPA, the plaintiffs ratified them by accepting and retaining the severance pay. Id.
50. Id. at 684.
51. Id. at 685.
52. Wamsley v. Champlin Refining and Chemicals, Inc., 11 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 1993).
The Wamsley opinion was handed down on December 30, 1993-one month and one
week after the Seventh Circuit decided Oberg. Id. The Wamsley Court found that "the
Seventh Circuit improperly analogized the FELA to the ADEA and, thus, arrived at the
erroneous conclusion that Hogue precludes a tender back requirement in suits brought
under the ADEA." Id. at 541.
53. Id. at 536.
54. id.
55. Id. at 536-37.
56. Id.; see also OWBPA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii) (1998).
57. Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 537.
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the majority, concluded that justice and equity require an em-
ployee to tender back the consideration received in exchange for
executing a waiver when the employee later seeks to avoid the
agreement.' The Wamsley Court distinguished between void and
voidable contracts and relied on the contract principle of ratifica-
tion.' The court noted that it did not interpret OWBPA language to
mean that a noncomplying waiver is void of legal effect but, rather,
that waivers that are not knowing or voluntary are subject to
avoidance only at the option of the employee.' The court held that
"[since the employees] chose to retain and not tender back.., the
benefits paid [to] them in consideration for their promise not to
sue Champlin, they manifested their intention to be bound by the
waivers and thus, made a new promise to abide by their terms."1
As a result, the Court held that regardless of whether the waiver
complies with OWBPA requirements, "[tlhe Court will enforce
their new conduct based promises as it legally and equitably
should," and, therefore, the employees' suit was barred.'
In Soliman v. Digital Equipment Corporation, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts followed the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Oberg.' The court held that a waiver
of ADEA claims that did not comply with OWBPA was entirely
void of legal effect and, as such, could not be ratified by an em-
ployee's act of merely accepting and retaining the benefits given in
exchange for the waiver.' The Soliman Court found that the ten-
der back of benefits received was not a prerequisite to filing an
58. Id. at 542. The Wamsley Court relied on previous Fifth Circuit decision, Gri//et v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (1991). Judge DeMoss noted that "[iln Gri//et, the
Court held that when an employee agrees to release her employer from liability under
the ADEA and receives benefits as consideration for the agreement, the employee rati-
fies the agreement if she retains the consideration after learning that the release is void-
able." Id. at 538 (citing Gril/et, 927 F.2d at 220).
59. Id. at 538. See also supra notes 13 and 16.
60. Id. at 539.
61. Id. at 540.
62. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 540.
63. Soliman v. Digital Equipment Corp., 869 F. Supp. 65 (D. Mass. 1994); Oberg, 11
F.3d at 679. As part of Digital's plan to achieve voluntary reduction of their workforce,
Soliman, age fifty-nine, was given a Transitional Financial Support Option ("TFSO"). Id.
at 66. The TFSO included "24.52 weeks of pay, a year of health insurance, and job
placement counseling in exchange for Soliman's voluntary resignation and waiver of all
claims against Digital, including any claims of age discrimination." Id. Soliman signed
the TFSO on December 13, 1990. Id.
64. Soliman, 869 F. Supp. at 68. OWBPA was enacted in October, 1990, and, in No-
vember, 1990, Digital gave the TFSO to its employees. Id. at 66. Digital admitted that
the waiver signed by Soliman did not comply with OWBPA. Id. at 67.
1998
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ADEA claim.' However, the court also held that the employer was
entitled to a deduction for the benefits received if the employee
later received damages.'
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan's 1995 decision in EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp. was also con-
sistent with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Oberg.7 The district
court held that the waivers executed by four employees releasing
Sara Lee from liability were not knowing and voluntary and could
not be ratified by the employees' acceptance and retention of their
severance benefits.' The court further specified that the tender
back of benefits is not a prerequisite to an ADEA suit.' Following
Soliman, the Sixth Circuit also held that if a plaintiff prevails, the
jury must determine what portion of benefits should be deducted
from any damages awarded.'
In contrast, in 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit followed Wamsley; the court held in Blistein v. St.
John's College' that a waiver that failed to comply with OWBPA
was merely voidable and could be ratified by accepting and retain-
ing benefits.' Judge Luttig, writing for the majority, held that
65. Id. at 69. Clarifying itself, the court explained that "OWBPA, in other words,
establishes a floor, not a ceiling. An effective waiver at a minimum must incorporate
OWBPA's requirements. A waiver that is more expansive that OWBPA would be valid,
but it must at least incorporate OWBPA's essentials." Id. at 69 n. 13.
66. Id. at 70.
67. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sara Lee Corp., 923 F. Supp. 994
(W.D. Mich. 1995). The court did not find Wamsley persuasive but, instead, followed
Oberg and held that "[u]nder OWBPA, unless a waiver contract takes the form required
by the statute, an employer and an employee cannot contract to waive the ADEA provi-
sions...." Id. at 998; See also OWBPA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(1) (1998).
68. Sara Lee Corp., 923 F. Supp. at 998. The court held that the Sara Lee "discharged
the [four] employees as part of a [group] employment termination program and that the
waivers contained in the severance agreements did not meet the statutory requirements
for knowing and voluntary waivers." Id. at 1000. The court concluded "as a matter of
law, that the waivers were not knowing and voluntary under the ADEA." Id. at 997.
69. Id. at 1000. The court held that "the employees did not ratify the waivers by ac-
cepting and retaining the benefits and that the employees [were] not required to tender
back the benefits." Id.
70. Id.
71. 74 F.3d 1459 (4th Cir. 1996). Blistein, 74 F.3d 1459, 1465 (4th Cir. 1996).
72. Blistein, 74 F.3d 1459, 1465 (4th Cir. 1996). The court found that "Wamsley, not
Oberg, is the post-OWBPA decision that is most in accord with our circuit precedent."
Id. at 1466. Blistein had been an "artist in residence" for twenty years at St. John's Col-
lege. Id. at 1463. As a result of severe budget cuts, the college eliminated Blistein's
position. Id. Although it was under no obligation to do so, the college immediately
notified Blistein of its decision, "so that he had the opportunity to retire before he be-
came ineligible for health benefits under the College's new benefits policy." Id. Blistein
decided to retire and received a generous benefit package. Id. Had the college waited
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"[n]othing in OWBPA... abrogates the common law principle that
an invalid agreement can be ratified by subsequent conduct."'
Therefore, the court held that "ratification of an invalid release of
an ADEA claim is possible."74
In 1997, the Third Circuit encountered the ratification and tender
back issues in Long v. Sears Roebuck & Company." However, the
Third Circuit's analysis differed slightly from the decisions of the
other circuits."6 The Third Circuit noted that, in both Oberg and
Wamsley, the courts first focused on whether the defective release
was voidable or void and then considered the issue of returning
the severance benefits. However, in Long, the Third Circuit rea-
soned that "the important question was whether the retention of
benefits prevents an ADEA claim."' The court concluded that nei-
ther the doctrine of ratification nor that of tender back was meant
to apply in ADEA cases; therefore, the court did not address the
void-voidable distinction.' Writing for the majority, Judge Mans-
mann found that "we are convinced that the ratification doctrine
should not apply to a waiver of age discrimination claims which is
invalid under the OWBPA and... [an employee] should not be re-
quired to tender back severance benefits before proceeding with
his age discrimination claims."'
to notify him, Blistein would not have been eligible for post-retirement health benefits.
Id. Nevertheless, Blistein later sued St. John's College for age discrimination. Id.
73. Id. at 1466. The court characterized the case as baseless and "precisely the type
of litigation that every day threatens to undermine, rather than advance, the laudable
objectives of the antidiscrimination laws by causing the Courts and the public alike to
view even the most meritious claims with suspicion." Id. at 1473.
74. Id.
75. Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529 (3d Cir. 1996). Long had been em-
ployed by Sears for more than thirty years. Id. at 531. For more than 12 years, Long
hadworked in the Home Improvement Products & Services Division ("HIPS"), where he
received excellent performance evaluations. Id. Upon being informed that Sears was
discontinuing the HIPS unit, Long signed a release, drafted by Sears, in which he waived
all claims associated with his employment and termination (including age discrimina-
tion). Id. The release did not comply with OWBPA provisions and was held to be inva-
lid. Id.
76. Id. at 1529. The district court followed the Wamsley decision and held that the
retention of the benefits ratified the waiver and barred the ADEA claim. Long v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., No. CIV.A. 95-0141, 1996 WL 94537 at *8 (E.D. Pa. 1996). However, the
Third Circuit decided the appeal as a matter of law and reversed the district court's
decision. Long, 105 F.3d at 1529.
77. Long, 105 F.3d at 1537.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1531. Long did not return or offer to return the more than $39,000 sever-
ance pay that he had received. Id.
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In Howlett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., ' the Sixth Circuit explored the
ratification and tender back issues and followed the Oberg Court's
reasoning.' The court held that an employee cannot ratify a re-
lease agreement that does not comply with OWBPA by retaining
the consideration received and that the tender back of the consid-
eration is not a prerequisite to filing a claim.' The court also found
that "[t]he OWBPA unambiguously states at Section 626(f)(1) that
an individual 'may not waive' ADEA claims unless the OWBPA re-
quirements are met. There is no hint of any exception."' The court
held that, under the terms of OWBPA, the release signed by the
plaintiffs was not knowing and voluntary and, consequently, was
not valid.' The Sixth Circuit also noted that the ratification doc-
trine could not validate the waiver.' The court concluded that, un-
der the ratification doctrine, a new promise would be made by the
employee retaining the benefits; nonetheless, the court held that
the new promise would be invalid because it too would not comply
with the terms of OWBPA2 7
In Oubre, the United States Supreme Court validated the deci-
sions of the majority of circuit courts and held that a waiver that
does not comply with OWBPA "knowing and voluntary" require-
ments cannot bar an ADEA claim.' Although a majority of the cir-
cuits have held that a valid waiver must meet the requirements of
OWBPA, a minority, including the Fifth Circuit, in Wamsley, and
the Fourth Circuit, in Blistein, have held otherwise.' The minority
81. 120 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 1997).
82. Howlett, 120 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 1997). After a corporate restructuring, the plain-
tiffs lost their jobs. Id. Each plaintiff signed a separate agreement releasing Holiday
Inns, Inc., from all claims relating to his or her employment in return for severance pay.
The releases were invalid under OWBPA. Id. See also, Oberg, 11 F.3d 679.
83. Howlett, 120 F.3d at 599. The plaintiffs did not return or offer to return the sever-
ance pay. Id. at 601.
84. Id. at 601.
85. Id. at 600.
86. Id. at 602.
87. Id.
88. See Hogue, 390 U.S. at 516; Oberg, 11 F.3d at 679; Soliman, 869 F.Supp. at 65;
Sara Lee Corp., 923 F.Supp. at 994; Long, 105 F.3d at 1529; and Howlett, 120 F.3d at 598,
discussed supra.
89. Howlett, 120 F.3d at 601. See Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 541; Blistein, 74 F.3d at 1472.
Blistein can be distinguished from Oubre in that, in Blistein, the defendant, St. John's
College, was under no obligation to provide Blistein the option to receive severance
benefits. Blistein, 74 F.3d at 1472. St. John's, under severe budgetary constraints and
purely of its own goodwill, agreed to provide Blistein with substantial benefits for him-
self and his family, to which he would not otherwise have been entitled. Id. After re-
ceiving the benefits, Blistein filed a suit for age discrimination. Id. Because Blistein's
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courts have held that the waiver is voidable and can be ratified by
the employee's failure to tender back the benefits.' Addressing this
particular issue, the Sixth Circuit in Howlett identified the problem
with the minority view, noting that "Blistein and Wamsley fail to
address the straightforward language of OWBPA Statute. Congress
has set out its own requirements for assessing ADEA waivers and
if the requirements are not met, the waiver is not effective."9' The
view of the Supreme Court and the majority of the circuits is the
better view because it is necessary to look at the plain text and
follow the statutes as Congress has written them." Therefore, if a
waiver of ADEA claims does not comply with OWBPA require-
ments, it is invalid and an employer cannot enforce that waiver
against the employee, regardless of contract principles.3
The stated purpose of Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in
Oubre was to specify that a waiver that is completed in violation of
OWBPA is not totally void of legal effect but is, instead, voidable at
the option of the employee.' Many of the Justices agreed with the
concept that Oubre's release was voidable but, nevertheless,
reached different results.95 Justice Breyer reasoned that a voidable
waiver would protect employees from employers who unilaterally
renege on their promise to provide severance pay or benefits.' He
also concluded that a voidable waiver would permit employers to
recover restitution of payments previously paid to employees in
return for the waiver when employees subsequently sued, thereby,
preventing a windfall to such an employee. 7
Although the Supreme Court held that Oubre was not required
to tender back the severance pay she received, it did not reach the
suit was baseless, as is clearly reflected in the court's decision, the holding cannot be
applied to a valid claim for age discrimination. Id.
90. Howlett, 120 F.3d at 601.
91. Id. The court wrote, "[tihe OWBPA unambiguously states at § 626(f)(1) that an
individual 'may not wdive' ADEA claims unless the OWBPA requirements are met....
Thus,... the employee 4qJd not assent to the waiver of his claims after having signed
the defective release than['could at the time of signing it." Id. at 601.
92. Id.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1998). It is significant to note that OWBPA speaks only to
valid waivers of ADEA claims and not to other claims that the employee might also have
waived in the release. Id.
94. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 843.
95. Id. at 844. Justice Breyer noted, "[alpparently, five or more Justices take this
view of the matter [that the invalid release was voidable not void]. As I understand the
majority's opinion, it is also consistent with this view.. .. " Id. at 845.




issue of whether EOI was entitled to restitution, recoupment, or
setoff from Oubre.98 Although the Supreme Court stopped short of
deciding this issue, a number of circuit courts have correctly held
that, in an Oubre scenario, the court should determine whether the
consideration received should be setoff against any later award to
the employee. ' This is also the result set forth in Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion."° Although OWBPA requirements must be met
to effectively waive an ADEA claim, an employee should not re-
ceive a windfall if his or her waiver was ineffective. Such an em-
ployee should be permitted to keep the compensation received
before trial, but that amount should offset any later award. The
Supreme Court's silence on this issue in Oubre does not preclude
courts from making such determinations in future proceedings.
101
In their dissenting opinions, Justices Thomas and Scalia agreed
that releases that are invalid under OWBPA are merely voidable."iu
However, each Justice retained a firm hold on the common law
doctrines of tender back and ratification." Both Justices argued
that neither tender back nor ratification was "abrogated" by
OWBPA.' Justice Thomas argued that, unless OWBPA explicitly
repealed these common law doctrines, they apply to ADEA
cases. ' According to Justice Thomas, "ratification does not con-
flict with the purpose of the OWBPA... because it occurs only
when the employee realizes that the release does not comply with
the OWBPA and nevertheless assents to be bound.""° However,
this result conflicts with OWBPA, which sets forth the require-
ments that must be met to validly waive an ADEA claim.' 7 Under
98. Id. at 842.
99. See Hogue, 390 U.S. at 517; Oberg, 11 F.3d at 685; Soliman, 869 F. Supp. at 69;
Sara Lee Corp., 923 F. Supp. at 994; and a recent post-Oubre decision, Rangel v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., NO. 96CV01249, 1998 WL 84603 (D.N.M. 1998) (addressing the waiver
of a Title VII claim.) In Rangel, the district court stayed proceedings until the Supreme
Court had decided Oubre and then held followed Oubre. RangdA 1998 WL 84603 at *1.
Judge Parker, writing for the majority, held that an employeeW not required to tender
back the severance pay received for a waiver of Title VII act'i*against an employer. Id.
The court also held that any award should be offset by the ainount of severance re-
ceived. Id.
100. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 844.
101. Id. at 841.
102. Id. at 845.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 846.
106. Id. at 847.
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1998).
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the statute, if a waiver does not comply with OWBPA provisions, it
is invaid-period. °8 In his dissent, Justice Scalia correctly stated
the principle: the mere fact that an employee initially and unknow-
ingly assents to a noncomplying waiver does not make that waiver
valid.
0 9
Both Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia reason that an employee
must tender back the consideration received as a precondition to
filing a suit."' Both Justices were concerned with the situation in
which an employee would receive a windfall if he or she were
permitted to retain the consideration or benefits and also bring suit
against the employer."' This concern is valid, but it can be ad-
dressed without invoking the common law doctrine of tender
back. The majority of circuit courts and Justice Breyer's concur-
ring opinion in Oubre have held that the tender back of considera-
tion is not a prerequisite to suing; however once an employee does
sue and recovers in court, the employer is entitled to restitution of
the consideration already paid to the employee."' Justice Thomas
and Justice Scalia go too far. the employee should be permitted to
sue, but any prior compensation should offset a later award result-
ing from the suit.
The Supreme Court's holding that the contract doctrines of ten-
der back and ratification are superseded by Congress' enactment
of OWBPA is a good start in the fight against age discrimination in
employment. However, America's older workers need greater pro-
tection. One major problem for aging workers is OWBPA's lack of
sanctions for employer noncompliance."3 For example, in Howlett,
the Court noted that "there is no automatic penalty if the employer
108. Id.
109. Oubre, 118 S. Ct. at 845. In his dissent, Justice Scalia agreed that although
OWBPA did not abrogate the doctrine of ratification, it was not applicable in the case of
a waiver that did not comply with OWBPA provisions. Id. According to Justice Scalia,
"[tihat a party later learns that those [knowing and voluntary] requirements were not
complied with no more enables ratification of the waiver than does such knowledge at
the time of contracting render the waiver effective ab initio [from inception]." Id.
110. Id. at 845.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 844. Justice Breyer argued that "[o]nce [the employee] has sued, however,
nothing in the statute prevents his employer from asking for restitution of his reciprocal
payment or relief from any ongoing reciprocal obligation." Id. Justice Breyer noted that
"[a] person who transfers something to another believing that the other thereby comes
under a duty to perform the terms of a contract.., is ordinarily entitled to restitution
for what he has given if the obligation intended does not arise and if the other does not
perform." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 47, Comment b (1936)).
113. Howlett, 120 F.3d at 602.
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fails to write a valid release."1 4 Therefore, one step in providing
increased protection would be for Congress to amend OWBPA to
include strict sanctions for waivers that violate the age discrimina-
tion statutes."' Under current age discrimination laws, employers
can ignore the statutes in hopes that they will not be taken to
court."6 Because age discrimination is a reality and a problem that
could potentially affect every worker at some point, the results of




115. Id. The Howlett Court noted that OWBPA requirements should not be hard for an
employer to meet and, therefore, there is no reason not to comply with the purpose of
OWBPA "to provide employees with sufficient information to evaluate the worth of
potential ADEA claims." Id. If sufficient information is given and an employee waives
his or her potential claims, then that employee would be precluded from bringing suit in
the future. Id. at 603.
116. Id. The court identified the following potential problem with the ADEA:
[11n cases where the employer knows that it has impermissibly discrimi-
nated based upon age. . . the employer may gamble and decide not to pro-
vide the OWBPA information, hoping that the employee who does not
know he has been discriminated against will be less likely to sue, and will
also accept less money for the ADEA waiver.
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